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Abstract  
Fiscal federalism, which mirrors the amount of fiscal autonomy and responsibility accorded to subnational 
government, has been an important subject in the policy equation of many developing, transition, and developed 
countries.. This paper, therefore, examined the evolution, structure, and practices of fiscal federalism in Nigeria. In 
achieving this, the paper adopted both descriptive and analytical methods by relying on secondary sources for data 
gathering. The paper revealed that Nigeria has not operated as a true federation since it adopted a federal 
constitution. Fiscal responsibility and taxing powers still remain considerably centralized. The practice of fiscal 
federalism in Nigeria has been inhibited by several factors which include, the dominance of the federal government 
in the revenue sharing, the protracted period of interregnum rule of the military, and over-reliance on the revenue 
from the Federation Account. The paper therefore concluded that the federal government ought to devolve some of 
its tax powers to state governments in order to stimulate healthy fiscal independence and competition among states. 
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal decentralization has become fashionable regardless of levels of development and civilization of 
societies. Nations are turning to devolution to improve the performance of their public sectors. Fiscal 
federalism is essentially about the allocation of government resources and spending to the various tiers of 
government. In general the intensification of clamour for greater decentralization is informed by a 
combination of people desiring to get more involved in government, and the inability of the central 
government to deliver quality services (Aigbokhan, 1999; Oates, 1972; Tanzi, 1995; Chete, 1998) 
Decentralized systems of government give rise to a set of fiscal exigencies referred to as fiscal federalism 
also known as fiscal decentralization. It refers to the scope and structure of the tiers of governmental 
responsibilities and functions, and the allocation of resources among the tiers of government to cope with 
respective functions.  
In Nigeria the dismal performance of the public sector since the first half of the 1980s has brought to the 
front burner the issue of fiscal federalism which has remained dominant and most contentious in Nigeria’s 
polity (Arowolo 2011). In the last three decades Nigerians have contended with  not only vanishing real 
incomes but also unbearable levels of unemployment and inflation, decay in social amenities and failure to 
maintain, not to talk of improving, the nation’s infrastructures. This dismal performance of the public sector 
has prevented the creation of opportunities for a resilient and sustainable growth and development of the 
Nigerian economy, which should be the object of rational and functional fiscal federalism. 
Long years of military rule and the centralized nature of the military hierarchical structure created the 
financial hegemony enjoyed by the federal government over the thirty states (36) states and seven hundred 
and seventy four (774) local governments. This has created disaffection in the Nigerian federation. Thus the 
worry over the development of a national and functional fiscal federalism for Nigeria is well founded.  
 
2. Conceptual issues  
Fiscal federalism is a byproduct of federalism. Federalism is a political concept in which power to govern is 
shared between national, and subnational governments creating what is often called a federation (Arowolo 
2011, Akindele and Olaopa, 2002). Federalism is a political concept in which the power to govern is shared 
between national, states and local governments, creating what is often called a federation (Arowolo, 2011, 
Akindele and Olaopa, 2002). Arowolo (2011, p.4) states that “It is a political theory that is divergent in 
concept, varied in ecology and dynamic in practice”. According to Vincent (2001), the concept of federalism 
implies that each tier of government is coordinate and independent in its delimited sphere of authority and 
should also have appropriate taxing powers to exploit its independent sources of revenue.  
Fiscal federalism demands that each level of government should have adequate resources to perform its 
functions without appealing to the other level of government for financial assistance (Wheare, 1963):  
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“If state authorities, for example, find that the services allotted them are too expensive for them 
to perform, and if they call upon the federal authority for grants and subsidies to assist them, 
they are no longer coordinate with the federal government but subordinate to it. Financial 
subordination makes an end of federalism in fact, no matter how carefully the legal forms may 
be preserved. It follows therefore that both state and federal authorities in a federation must be 
given the power in the constitution each to have access to and to control, its own sufficient 
financial resources. Each must have a power to tax and to borrow for the financing of its own 
services by itself”.  
For any federation to be sustained there must be fiscal decentralization and financial autonomy. Fiscal 
decentralization means delegating decision-making to lower levels of government instead of concentrating it 
at the centre. Each level of government, therefore, should be free to take decisions and allocate resources 
according to its own priorities in its own area of jurisdiction. In addition, the federating units should be able 
to act independently on matters within their own jurisdiction (Ewetan, 2011). 
Fiscal federalism is concerned with “understanding which functions and instruments are best centralized 
and which are best placed in the sphere of decentralized levels of government” (Oates, 1999). Fiscal 
federalism is a general normative framework for the assignment of functions to the different levels of 
government and appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out these functions (Arowolo, 2011). It is a set of 
guiding principles or concept that helps in designing financial relations between the national and subnational 
levels of government, while fiscal decentralisation is the process of applying such principles (Sharma, 2005). 
Fiscal federalism concerns the division of public sector functions and finances among different tiers of 
government (Ozo-Eson, 2005).  
Fiscal federalism is characterized by fiscal relations between central and lower levels of government. The 
fiscal relationships between and among the constituents of the federation is explained in terms of three main 
theories, namely, the theory of fiscal relation which concerns the functions expected to be performed by each 
level of government in the fiscal allocation; the theory of interjurisdictional cooperation which refers to areas 
of shared responsibility by the national, state and local governments, and the theory of multijurisdictional 
community (Tella, 1999). In this case, each jurisdiction (state, region or zone) will provide services whose 
benefits will accrue to people within its boundaries, and so, should use only such sources of finance as will 
internalize the costs. 
 
3. Theory of fiscal federalism  
The basic foundations for the initial theory of Fiscal Federalism were laid by Kenneth Arrow, Richard 
Musgrave and Paul Sadweh Samuelson. Samuelson’s two important papers (1954, 1955) on the theory of 
public goods, Arrows discourse (1970) on the roles of the public and private sectors and Musgrave’s book 
(1959) on public finance provided the framework for what became accepted as the proper role of the state in 
the economy. The theory was later to be known as “Decentralisation Theorem” (Ozo-Eson, 2005). 
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This framework identifies three roles for the government sector. These are correcting various dimensions 
of market failure, maintaining macroeconomic stability, and redressing income inequality. The central 
government is responsible for the correction of market failure and maintenance of macroeconomic stability, 
while the subnational governments and the central government are jointly responsible for redressing income 
inequality (Ozon-Eson, 2005). 
Each tier of government is seen as seeking to maximize the social welfare of the citizens within its 
jurisdiction. This multi-layered quest becomes very important where public goods exists, the consumption of 
which is not national in character, but localized. In such circumstances, local outputs targeted at local 
demands by respective local jurisdictions clearly provide higher social welfare than central provision. This 
principle, which Oates (1972) has formalized into the “Decentralization Theorem” constitutes the basic 
foundation for what may be referred to as the first generation theory of fiscal decentralization (Oates, 2006a; 
Bird, 2009). The theory focuses on situations where different levels of government provide efficient levels of 
outputs of public goods “for those goods whose special patterns of benefits are encompassed by the 
geographical scope of their jurisdictions” (Oates, 2006b). Such situation came to be known as “perfect 
mapping” or “fiscal equivalence” (Ma, 1995; Olson, 1996). 
Nevertheless, it was also recognized that, given the multiplicity of local goods with varying geographical 
patterns of consumption, there was hardly any level of government that could produce a perfecting mapping 
for all public goods. Thus, it is recognized that there would be local public goods with inter-jurisdictional 
spill-overs. For example, a road may confer public goods characteristics, the benefits of which are enjoyed 
beyond the local jurisdiction. The local authority may then under-provide for such a good. To avoid this, the 
theory then resort to traditional Pigouvian subsidies, requiring the central government to provide matching 
grants to the lower level government so that it can internalize the full benefits. 
Based on the preceding, the role of government in maximizing social welfare through public goods 
provision is assigned to the lower tiers of government. The other two roles of income distribution and 
stabilization are regarded as suitable for the central government. 
From the foregoing, the role assignment which flows from the basic theory of fiscal federalism is 
summarized as follows: The central government is expected to ensure equitable distribution of income, 
maintain macroeconomic stability and provide public goods that are national in character. Decentralized 
levels of government on the other hand are expected to concentrate on the provision of local public good 
with the central government providing targeted grants in cases where there are jurisdictional spill-overs 
associated with local public goods. 
Once the assignment of roles had been carried out, the next step in the theoretical framework is to 
determine the appropriate taxing framework. In addressing this tax assignment problem, attention is paid to 
the need to avoid distortions resulting from decentralized taxation of mobile tax bases. Gordon (1983) 
emphasizes that the extensive application of non-benefit taxes on mobile factors at decentralized levels of 
government could result in distortions in the location of economic activity. 
Following from the assignment of functions, taxes that matched more effectively the assigned functions 
are also assigned to the relevant tier or level of government. For example, progressive income tax is suited to 
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the functions of income redistribution and macro-economic stabilization and is therefore assigned to the 
central government. On the other hand, property taxes and user fees were deemed more appropriate for 
local governments. Benefits taxes are also prescribed for decentralized governments based on the conclusion 
that such taxes promote economic efficiency when dealing with mobile economic units, be they individual or 
firms (Olson, 1982). 
The final element of this basic theory is the need for fiscal equalization. This is in the form of lump sum 
transfers from the central government to decentralized governments. The arguments for equalization are 
mainly two. The first which is on efficiency grounds sees equalization as a way of correcting for distorted 
migration patterns. The second is to provide assistance to poorer regions or jurisdictions. Equalization is 
important in a number of federations. For example, Canada has an elaborate equalization scheme built into 
her inter-governmental fiscal arrangements (Boadway and Hobson, 2009; Weingast, 1995). 
It necessary to point out that recent literature emphasizes the importance of reliance on own revenues for 
financing local budgets. A number of authors (Weingast, 1997; Mckinnon, 1997) draw attention to the 
dangers of decentralized levels of government relying too heavily on intergovernmental transfers for 
financing their budgets. These are lessons that Nigeria’s fiscal system should draw from in order to ensure 
macroeconomic stability. 
 
4. The review of revenue commissions and allocation formula in Nigeria: 1946 – 1999 
The issue of fiscal federalism is a unique one as it has generated intense debate in Nigeria. Arowolo (2011, p. 
9) notes that “It is characterized by constant struggle, clamour for change, and very recently, violence in the 
form of agitation for resource control in the Niger-Delta”. Agitations for more decentralized fiscal 
arrangement by lower tiers of government have continued to be resisted by a leviathan federal government. 
Various commissions and committees have been set up to address this issue over the years. These 
committees will be examined under three phases of revenue allocation in Nigeria. 
4.1. The first phase of revenue allocation, 1946-1964 
The task of the early fiscal commissions, from Phillipson Commission of 1946 to Sir Louis Chicks Commission 
of 1954 was limited to allocating equitably to the regional governments total “non-declared” revenue 
(consisting mainly of import and export duties and excise and company taxes) which, under the Constitution, 
was determined by the central government. Phillipson Commission recommended the use of derivation and 
even development as criteria for distribution of revenue. Each region’s sharewere as follows: North, 46 per 
cent; west, 30 per cent and East, 24 per cent. 
The Hick-Phillipson Commission (1950) recommended need, derivation, independent revenue or fiscal 
autonomy and national interest as the criteria for revenue sharing. Chicks Commission (1954) recommended 
derivation. Raisman Commission (1957) Raisman Commission recommended a Distributable Pool Account 
(DPA) shared among the regions as follows: North, 40%; East, 31%; West, 24% and Southern Cameroun, 5%. 
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In 1961, Southern Cameroun left the federation, and the DPA was redistributed as follows: North, 42%; East, 
33% and West, 25%. In 1963, when the Mid-West was created the share of the then Western Region was 
divided between it and the new region in the ratio of 3:1 (Ewetan, 2011, p. 98-99; Arowolo, 2011, p. 10). The 
Binns Commision (1964) rejected the principles of need and derivation. In its place, it suggested regional 
financial responsibility and percentage division of 42% to the north, 30% to the east, 20% to the west, and 
8% to the mid-west. 
4.2. The second phase of revenue allocation, 1967-1979 
Following the creation of 12 states in May, 1967 the Constitutional (Financial Provisions) Decree No. 15 of 
1967 was promulgated to share the revenue in the Distributable Pool Account (DPA) among the new states 
as follows: East Central, 17.5 per cent; Lagos, 2 per cent; Mid-West, 8 per cent; the six Northern, states 7 per 
cent; South Eastern, 7.5 per cent; Rivers, 5 per cent; West, 18 per cent. The decree did not apply any uniform 
principle to all states. In particular, it failed to take cognizance of the key elements which formed the basis of 
the previous allocations of revenue among the regions, namely, population, derivation, consumption, among 
others (Ewetan 2011, p. 99). 
The Dina Commission (1969) recommended national minimum standards, balanced development in the 
allocation of the states joint account and basic need (Arowolo 2011, p. 10). 
Subsequent decrees between 1970 and 1975 aimed at correcting the anomalies of Decree No. 15 of 1967, 
by reallocating revenue to states on a more equitable basis (Ewetan 2011, p. 99). Aboyade Technical 
Committee (1977) recommended a national minimum standard for national integration (22%0, equality of 
access to development opportunities (25%), absorptive capacity (21%), fiscal efficiency (15%) and 
independent revenue effort (18%). Other criteria are (57%) to Federal Government, (30%) to State 
Governments, (10%) to Local Governments, and (3%) to a special fund (Arowolo 2011, p. 10 ). 
4.3. The third phase of revenue allocation, 1979-1999  
In 1979, the federal government set up a six-man Revenue Allocation Commission under the chairmanship of 
Dr. P.N.C Okigbo. The Commission recommended percentages on principles: population (40%), equality 
(40%), social development (15%), and internal revenue effort (5%). Percentages for government: Federal 
(53%), States (30%), Local Governments (10%), Special Fund (7%) (Ewetan 2011, p. 101;  Arowolo 2011, p. 
10). 
The 1979 Constitution had four important consequences on revenue sharing. First, the federal 
government ceased to monopolize the retention of fast growing revenues such as company income tax and 
petroleum profit tax. Second, the proportionate share of each level of government was fixed and made more 
certain. Third, the local governments hitherto regarded as arms of their respective state governments were 
recognized as an independent revenue sharing unit in the federation. Finally, the derivation criterion almost 
disappeared as an important principle for revenue sharing. 
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The 1984 Allocation of Revenue Act further modified the sharing formula as follows: federal, 50 per cent; 
states, 30 per cent; local governments, 15 per cent and “others”, that is, oil producing areas and ecological 
fund, 5.0 per cent (Ewetan 2011, p. 102).  
Danjuma Commission (1988) recommended percentages for government: Federal (50%), States (30%), 
Local Government (15%), and Special Fund (5%) (Arowolo 2011, p. 10). 
Also, experience has shown that revenue allocation presents the most intractable problem in Nigeria’s 
fiscal federalism. There is no generally acceptable formula for both vertical and horizontal distribution of 
revenue. Various criteria used for allocating resources were not based on a rational consideration but on the 
basis of other primordial consideration. Thus the formulae only crippled the revenue generation capacity of 
each state, as states rely wholly on the monthly allocation from the federation account. The implication of 
this revenue allocation dependence is that it limits the capacities of states and local governments to provide 
public goods needed to promote and sustain governance. The issue is that the federal government takes the 
lion’s share of centrally collected revenue based on the current formula and other retained revenue, leaving 
state and local governments with small shares compared to their assigned functions. 
 
5. Nature and challenges of fiscal federalism in Nigerian 
The legal basis of fiscal federalism is derived from the past constitutional arrangements and, hence, in any 
true federalism the fiscal powers of all tiers of government must be related to the functions and 
responsibilities assigned to them by the Constitution.  
Constitutionally, Nigeria is a federation, but in practice, and with the assumption of power by successive 
military administrations, the constitution has always been suspended and the country ruled more or less like 
a unitary state. The imposition of a centralized unitary system on a federal structure under the military 
administration partly explains our experience of poor fiscal management and low economic performance 
which, over the years, had adversely inhibited the true practice of fiscal federalism.  
The establishment of the federal system in Nigeria was based on rounds of constitutional conferences in 
England prior to the grant of independence by the British government. Constitutions delineated the functions 
to be performed by each tier of government. The importance of these constitutional arrangements was to 
ensure that the statutory fiscal functions and the financial resources to be applied for effective performance 
of these functions by each tier of government was explicitly stated under the constitution and were to be 
enforced judiciously. Unfortunately, the statutory shares of state and local governments were reduced 
through ad hoc fiscal measures such as the stabilization fund, dedication of crude petroleum for expenditure 
on special federal projects, Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund (PTF), upfront deduction of external debt 
obligations among others. The overall effect of this on the nation was that the disguised movement towards a 
unitary state under military administration did not advance the practice of fiscal federalism as the federal 
system was replaced by an ineffective unitary state. 
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Under military administrations, issues of statutory functions to be performed by each level of 
administration and the allocation of revenue in support of effective delivery of public goods and services 
were bypassed. Observing this trend of substantial deviation from fiscal federalism, the Aboyade Presidential 
Commission on Revenue Allocation (1977) stated as follows: 
The defacto federal superiority vis-à-vis the states and the huge autonomous increases in 
revenue accruing to the Federal Military Government resulted in arbitrary aggregation of 
functions on the part of the centre which normally are matters of constitutional debates and 
agreement. In addition to legislative measures, executive actions over a number of matters such 
as the universal primary education, agriculture, higher education, roads, the setting up of 
ministries of water resources, housing, urban development, environment, and social development 
youths and sports illustrate the development of this system. 
Concluding, the Aboyade Commission observed that these measures had tended to detract from true fiscal 
federalism in Nigeria. This trend, which was first observed in the 1970s, has continued into the 2000s, thus 
resulting in bloated federal budgets while the fiscal operations for many years resulted in overall deficits. 
The level of the budget deficits became unsustainable as the federal government assumed fiscal 
responsibilities which, under the federal constitution, should be performed by the lower tiers of government. 
The deficit gaps were met largely through credit from the Central Bank with its implications for high rate 
inflation and low economic growth (Okunrounmu 1999). 
Another dimension of the military rule that has hindered the practice of true federalism is the incessant 
and unsystematic creation of new states. The outcome of this was an excessively bloated fiscally structure 
and many of the states created were not financially viable as they lacked the fiscal capacity to achieve any 
meaningful development.  
Another issue is the dominance of the federal government in the sharing of national resources from the 
common purse popularly known as the Federation Account. The federal government has always had more 
than what the revenue-sharing formula stipulated. In relative terms, the share of the federal government 
from the common purse had declined from 70.0 per cent in 1960 to 65.0 per cent in 1963, 55.0 per cent in 
1980, 50.0 per cent in 1990 and 48.5 per cent in 1993, and had remained at that level until 2002 when it 
went up to about 52 per cent. In absolute terms, however, the average share of the federal government has 
remained at between 60 to 65 per cent in most cases of the years (Sarah et al, 2003) 
Fiscal federalism, from the very beginning, raised several fundamental issues. The assignment of 
responsibilities among federating units in Nigeria has also created problems. First, there was the question of 
how each level of government would be given adequate fiscal powers to enable it maximize its revenue and 
discharge its constitutional duties and still preserve its fiscal autonomy. While a reduction of fiscal 
independence through central administration of a particular tax may conflict with the principle of fiscal 
independence of states and local government the hard choice might be between more fiscal powers and less 
revenue, or less fiscal powers and more revenue. The introduction of value added tax (VAT) which replaces 
states’ sales tax and administered by the federal government is an example of one of such conflicts. 
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Second, there were problems of allocating the centrally collected revenue equitably among all the levels of 
governments. In order to resolve this problem, various principles had been tried by different fiscal 
commissions and, so far, there are yet to be fully acceptable principles for sharing revenue. Very often, lack of 
adequate data for objective analysis had exacerbated, rather than ameliorated, the revenue sharing problem 
among states and local governments.  
Third, fiscal federalism had been encumbered in the past by non-jurisdictional problems such as 
imbalance in population, size of land area, resource endowments and levels of development. Consequently, 
there has been a growing gap between the requirements of individual states and local government and the 
revenues they are able to raise on their own. This sharp difference between the very rich and the very poor 
levels of government tended to influence the principles applied in favour of poorer states, and sometimes at 
the expense of the richer ones. 
Fourth, while the creation of states and local governments by the military government was to produce a 
balanced federation, the emergence and proliferation of states and local governments have continued to pose 
new problems for intergovernmental fiscal relations.  Although, a major objective of the military government 
in creating states was to reduce the political powers of the regions and play down regional/ethnic politics 
that was already cracking the new federal structure, unfortunately, it also saw it as an opportunity to use its 
military might to assert the “supremacy” of federal government fiscal powers over the states. 
The present allocation of functions is based on the 1999 Constitution, which divided government 
functions into three categories of legislative powers. “The exclusive list, on which only the federal 
government can act; the concurrent list, which contains responsibilities shared by both federal and state 
governments; and the residual list, which is reserved for state governments. The federal government has 
responsibility for functions whose benefits extend nationwide, such as, defence, foreign trade, immigration, 
currency among others” (Akpan, 2011, p. 169). It also has responsibility for important business undertakings 
through parastatals, for example, railways, electricity among others, while functions whose benefits have the 
possibility of spilling over state boundaries were placed on the concurrent list. Local governments, on the 
other hand, have responsibility for functions whose benefits accrue to a limited geographical area such as 
markets, primary education, and cemeteries among others. 
The different formulas that have been used for revenue allocation have consistently increased the 
financial powers of the federal government against the other levels of government, The allocation of the most 
productive income-elastic taxes to the federal government have made the centre financially stronger than the 
states and local governments. The principal effect of this is the increasing fiscal dependence of the lower 
governments on federally collected revenue (both statutory and non-statutory), and their inability to meet 
the cost of functions assigned to them.  
Over-dependence on oil revenue has impacted negatively and posed serious challenges to the issues of 
fiscal federalism in the country. It has created the leech syndrome whereby the states have become economic 
appendage of the federal government and eroded the fiscal autonomy of the federating units. Thus it has 
created a master servant relationship in which the subnational governments are at the mercy of the federal 
government. As long as states and local governments continue to depend on the federal government for their 
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“economic development and survival, the wrangling and controversy surrounding the issue of revenue 
allocation will remain persistent and a recurrent problem in Nigerian fiscal federalism” (Arowolo, 2011, p. 
15).  
The overview of the nature and challenges of fiscal federalism in Nigeria have been presented to show 
deviation from the true practice of fiscal federalism in Nigeria. The main issue is that if the three tiers of 
government in a federal system were to simultaneously intervene in a market economy, without 
coordination, and perform the role of the public sector, the situation will be chaotic. Therefore, in order to 
ensure sustainable growth and national development, it is necessary to understand and institutionalize the 
policy issues of fiscal federalism. 
More importantly, the horizontal distribution principles have remained contentious and have been 
described as unfair by some political zones. The emphasis on population is the most important issue, 
resulting from complaints that population figures were manipulated in favour of some states.  
Furthermore, the progressive decline of weights on derivation principle for revenue sharing has also been 
criticized. The basis of emphasis on derivation was to make the units maximize the yield from available tax 
sources as well as promote fiscal discipline among the sub national governments. The issue of landmass and 
terrain undermines the interest of the states with small landmass. The trend of progressive opinion is that 
this criterion of landmass should be excluded from the revenue allocation system. As it is now, Nigerian fiscal 
federalism is fraught with so many problems. 
 
6. Conclusion and policy implication 
The paper analyzed the evolution of fiscal federalism, evolved a theoretical basis for fiscal federalism and 
discussed extensively on the nature and challenges of fiscal relations in Nigeria. The paper concluded that 
fiscal responsibility and taxing powers still remain considerably centralized. “The Federal Government 
always receives larger amount in the sharing formula and with less impact on the people” (Arowolo, 2011, p. 
17). Any reliable revenue allocation and utilization system must practically reflect the Federal nature of our 
country. The lopsided nature of fiscal arrangement in favour of the federal government is detrimental to 
fiscal operations of state and local governments and this has impacted negatively on socio economic 
development of Nigeria. Greater emphasis should be laid at the grassroots where the bulk of the people live 
and where development appears to be virtually non-existent.  
A number of factors have inhibited the practice of fiscal federalism in Nigeria. These include the 
dominance of the federal government in revenue sharing from the Federation Account, the centralist system 
of fiscal relations, critical issue of over dependence on oil revenue, conflict over sharing principle, and 
disharmonious federal-state relations. 
“The intractable problems arising from the widely unacceptable and constant conflicting fiscal federalism 
in Nigeria need urgent measures” (Arowolo, 2011). Accordingly, the following suggestions are proffered. 
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 The need to reverse the age long fiscal dominance by the federal government in order to re-establish 
a true federal system is strongly recommended. The solution is to redress the prevailing mismatch by 
raising the level of taxing assignment of subnational governments. 
 The need for an efficient formula between the centre and other tiers of government is recommended. 
This formula should also satisfy the broad objectives of inter-regional equity and balanced national 
development. To this end the present vertical revenue allocation formula should be reviewed by the 
federal government to increase the percentage to lower governments in Nigeria to strengthen their 
fiscal capacity and enable them play strong role in nation building.  
 Also, it is imperative to embark on radical diversification of the Nigerian economy to other viable and 
productive sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, mining, industry and human development 
 Urgent reform in fiscal federalism in Nigeria to address the constitutional issue of fiscal powers 
among the three tiers of government to redress the prevailing fiscal mismatch at subnational levels of 
government is strongly recommended.  
 The need to diversify and strengthen the fiscal base of subnational governments is recommended. To 
this end, local tax administration should be improved, unproductive local taxes eliminated, and 
untapped tax potentials identified. 
 The need to promote fiscal discipline at all levels of government to sustain macroeconomic stability is 
strongly recommended. The policy should compulsorily place effective limits on governments’ 
deficits at all levels, consistent with the objective of macroeconomic stability to ensure sustainable 
national development. 
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